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Abstract 
After spinning off the commercial banking functions that the central bank had performed for 
many years into three new banks, post-Communist Hungary faced a severe recession in 
1992. The recession led to a high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking system. 
In 1992, the Hungarian government announced a Loan Consolidation Program (LCP) to 
remove bad debt from the balance sheets of banks on a voluntary basis. Depending on the 
date when a loan was classified as “bad,” the government paid 50%, 80%, or 100% of book 
value. In 1992, banks transferred bad debt with a book value of HUF 102.5 billion ($1.3 
billion) in exchange for HUF 83 billion in special credit consolidation bonds. They transferred 
an additional HUF 17.3 billion in bad debt at face value in 1993. Even after these transfers, 
banks still held large portfolios of nonperforming loans to state-owned enterprises. In 1993, 
the government announced a second, “firm-oriented” LCP to acquire the bad debts of specific 
state-owned enterprises from banks. Acquisitions under this program totaled HUF 61.3 
billion. Rather than create a centralized asset management company (AMC) to manage the 
two loan consolidation programs, the government used existing state-owned agencies. A 
portion of the debt purchased under the bank-oriented LCP was sold to a state-owned agency 
for resolution and disposal; for the firm-oriented LCP, two government agencies were 
responsible for the management and disposal of acquired bad debt. The government entered 
into temporary arrangements with the selling banks to continue to manage nonperforming 
loans until they could be sold. The LCPs temporarily improved bank balance sheets, but high 
levels of nonperforming loans continued to weigh on bank balance sheets because of the 
voluntary nature of the LCPs and continued economic deterioration. The government 
followed the LCPs with a recapitalization program in 1993 and 1994.  
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At a Glance  
In 1987, the Hungarian government began to 
reform the banking system from “one-tier” 
bank system to a “two-tier” banking system 
(IMF 1995). The “one-tier” system consisted 
of a bank for households (Országos 
Takarékpénztár (OTP) and the National Bank 
of Hungary (NBH)3, which had served both 
central and commercial banking purposes. 
The Hungarian government spun out three 
credit departments from the NBH to form 
three large state-owned commercial banks: 
the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB), the 
National Commercial Credit Bank (K&H), and 
the Budapest Bank (BB) (Ábel and Bonin 
1993a; Nováková 2003; IMF 1995). These 
banks inherited loan portfolios and 
customers from the central bank (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997).  
Between 1990 and 1993, real GDP in 
Hungary fell by approximately 20% 
(Nováková 2003). This severe recession led 
many of the loans that were transferred from 
the NBH to become nonperforming. Banking 
problems were exacerbated by lack of clear 
regulation, lack of proper supervision, and 
insufficient experience among bank staff in 
risk assessment and loan evaluations (Ábel 
and Szakadát 1997). Furthermore, bank 
customers tended to be concentrated in 
specific sectors, because MHB, K&B, and BB 
were formed from the industrial, food processing, and infrastructure financing departments 
of the central bank, making the banks vulnerable to the economic recession (IMF 1995). 
The Hungarian government passed the Banking Act, which became effective on December 1, 
1991, and required banks to reach a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8% by 1994 and to 
accumulate loan-loss reserves (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). This act also introduced three 
 
3 The Magyar Nemzeti Bank or MNB.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To improve certain financial indicators of 
troubled commercial banks; to narrow the interest 
margin; to provide a sound basis for prudent 
banking activities that would also facilitate the 
privatization of SOCBs; and to help the 




Announcement:  1992 (IMF 1995) 









17% of banking system loans in 1992 
Legacy state-directed loans to state-




Not specified at outset 
Eligible 
institutions 
Banks with a capital adequacy ratio of 
less than 7.25%  
Open bank only  
Usage HUF 181.1 billion ($2.3 billion) 
transferred in exchange for HUF 
155.9.3 billion in government bonds  
Outcomes Bank-oriented LCP: HUF 6 billion 
recovered by 1997  
Firm-oriented LCP: Full write-down 
on HUF 24 billion, debt for equity 






Banks remained responsible for 
management and disposal of majority 
of transferred bad debt; no 
centralized AMC; involved both firm-
oriented and bank-oriented loan 
consolidation programs 
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categories for rating loan portfolios. The classification of loans under the Banking Act 
required that banks classify assets as “bad” if the borrower was in default for more than one 
year or if the borrower had filed for bankruptcy; these loans required 100% provisioning by 
1994. The other two categories of assets that required provisions were “substandard” loans 
and “doubtful” loans, which required 20% and 50% provisions, respectively. A month later, 
the government enacted a new bankruptcy law, which became effective on January 1, 1992, 
requiring any company with any outstanding debt that was more than 90 days in arrears to 
initiate bankruptcy proceedings “or the responsible parties would be subject to criminal 
prosecution” (Ábel and Bonin 1993a).  
The combination of the recession, the bankruptcy reform, and the new loan classification 
standards led to a rapid increase in the portion of loans that banks reported as 
nonperforming, from an estimated 9% in 1991 to 17% in 1992. Credit spreads increased, 
and viable borrowers began to seek out alternative sources of credit (IMF 1995). Total bank 
lending decreased, and banks did not have sufficient loan loss provisions (IMF 1995; Ábel 
and Szakadát 1997).  
In 1992, the Hungarian government announced measures to address nonperforming loans. 
The first measure was the 1992–1993 bank-oriented Loan Consolidation Program (LCP) 
(Ábel and Szakadát 1997). Banks with a CAR of less than 7.25% were eligible to sell bad debt 
to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), on behalf of the government, in exchange for government 
bonds (IMF 1995). Only loans issued prior to October 1, 1992, and classified as “bad” were 
eligible for transfer to the government. In exchange for the nonperforming debt, the 
government issued long-term “consolidation” bonds and deducted accumulated risk 
reserves from the banks (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). Initially, the government issued Series A 
bonds in exchange for loan principal and Series B bonds for interest arrears and fees, but 
ultimately replaced Series B bonds with Series A bonds that paid higher interest rates 
(Várhegyi and Boros-Kazai 1994; Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
Fourteen banks and 69 credit cooperatives participated in the bank-oriented LCP (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997). In 1992, the government purchased loans and interest claims with a total 
face value of HUF 102.5 billion ($1.3 billion)4 in exchange for a total of HUF 81.3 billion in 
consolidation bonds (Balassa 1996). Later, in 1993, the government acquired HUF 17.3 
billion in additional bad debt at face value from three financial institutions under the LCP 
(Ábel and Szakadát 1997). The discount on book value for a given asset depended on when 
the loan was classified as bad: loans classified as bad in 1991 received 50% of face value 
while loans classified as bad in 1992 received 80% of face value (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). 
For the debt of certain companies, the government paid 100% of face value (Balassa 1996). 
In 1993, the Hungarian government launched a “firm-oriented” LCP program to allow banks 
to sell debt of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The government selected 13 industrial 
 




The Hungarian Loan Consolidation Program Dreyer
 
 
SOEs and later added eight food processing firms, multiple state farms and agricultural 
cooperatives, and the Hungarian Railways company. The government purchased debt of 
industrial and food processing companies at a 10% discount. It purchased debt of Hungarian 
Railways, state farms, and agricultural cooperatives at face value (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). 
Similar to the bank-oriented credit consolidation, the government issued consolidation 
bonds in exchange for the bad loans. Under the firm-oriented LCP, the government 
exchanged a total of HUF 57.3 billion in consolidation bonds for bad debt with a face value of 
HUF 61.3 billion (Balassa 1996). (See Figure 1.) 
Figure 1. Debt Purchased from Hungarian Banks under the Loan Consolidation 
Programs 
 Book value Transfer price 
Average 
discount  
1992 Bank-oriented LCP  HUF 102.5 billion  HUF 81.3 billion 21% 
1993 Ad-hoc bank-oriented 
LCP* 
HUF 17.3 billion  HUF 17.3 billion 0% 
Firm-oriented LCP HUF 61.3 billion HUF 57.3 billion 6.5% 
Total debt purchased from 
banks under LCPs 
HUF 181.1 HUF 155.9 billion   
*Note: Under the 1993 bank-oriented LCP, the government included three smaller banks in an ad-hoc 
consolidation process, purchasing HUF 17.3 billion in debt at face value.  
Sources: IMF 1995; Balassa 1996; Ábel and Szakadát 1997. 
Though MoF purchased the bad debt, a majority of the debt from the bank-oriented cleanup 
remained with the selling banks to manage until 1994; the MoF and the selling banks entered 
into renewable, three-month contracts for the temporary management of the transferred 
debt (Balassa 1996). The MoF sold approximately HUF 40 billion of debt at face value to the 
Hungarian Investment and Development Corporation (HIDB), a government-owned entity, 
and it appears that the loans were sold based on the viability of debt resolution and workout 
procedures (IMF 1995). The HIDB was responsible for resolving claims with the creditors of 
the transferred debt, and during the first half of 1993, the HIDB completed agreements with 
debtor firms—most of which involved reorganizations or liquidations (IMF 1995). Bad debt 
remaining from the bank-oriented LCP was offered for sale to businesses engaged in the 
management of nonperforming debt; it appears that HUF 7 billion in bad debt was sold in 
this manner for a price of approximately 10% of face value. In 1995, the HIDB took over the 
management of the remaining HUF 63 billion in bad debt and was allowed to retain 35% of 
the net revenues from the debt recovery (Balassa 1996; Ábel and Szakadát 1997). As of 1997, 
the total recovery on the bank-oriented LCP totaled approximately HUF 6 billion (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997).  
Under the firm-oriented LCP, the SOE-related bad debt was transferred to the Hungarian 
State Holding Company and the State Property Agency (IMF 1995). In 1994, the Hungarian 
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State Holding Company forgave all of the claims it acquired, which comprised a book value 
of HUF 24 billion in debt from eight SOEs (IMF 1995; Balassa 1996). The State Property 
Agency did not have the same legal authority: it swapped HUF 16 billion in debt for equity in 
SOEs, and then transferred the remaining debt to a new State Privatization and Holding 
Company (Balassa 1996).  
Summary Evaluation 
The LCP temporarily improved the balance sheets of Hungarian banks. Bad debt held by 
banks declined by more than 50%, and bank CARs increased from their prior negative levels 
(IMF 1995). Despite having positive CARs by Hungarian accounting standards, most 
Hungarian banks continued to have negative CARs by international accounting standards 
(Ábel and Szakadát 1997). 
The transfer of NPLs to the government in 1993 was not sufficient to stabilize the Hungarian 
banking system. Despite the transfer of HUF 180 billion in bad debt under the LCP, HUF 352 
billion in bad debt remained on bank balance sheets at the end of 1993—a volume similar to 
that at the end of 1992, prior to the LCP. The LCP was followed by a recapitalization program 
in 1993 and 1994 because the NPL ratio remained high.5 The LCP also failed to address 
operational and organizational issues within the banks. The recapitalization program 
required that banks enter into a consolidation agreement with the government which would 
specify plans for reorganization and debt resolution (IMF 1995).  
In 1995, the IMF noted that it was “not difficult to make the case that the 1992 LCP promoted 
expectations among the banks of further bailouts in the future” (IMF 1995). Because the LCP 
was voluntary, banks withheld a number of bad loans that were eligible for transfer. It 
appears that at the time of the bank-oriented LCP, banks expected that the government 
would pay a higher price on bad debt from SOEs, as proved the case in the firm-oriented LCP 
(IMF 1995). Furthermore, the decision to temporarily contract out the management of debt 
to the originating banks “had no effect whatsoever on either the enterprises concerned or on 
the recovery of the claims” because the banks did not have the opportunity or incentive to 
enter into negotiations with the debtor companies (Balassa 1996).  
Balassa (1996) calls some of the Hungarian government’s actions “insufficiently considered, 
suboptimal or absolutely mistaken steps.” He argues that the missteps increased the total cost 
of the bank system restructuring and estimates that the total cost could have been up to 25% 
less than the actual cost. Beyond the ineffectiveness of the initial LCP at addressing the stock 
of problem loans, he noted that the public viewed the LCP as a “gigantic income transfer at 
the expense of society, the citizens and businesses in favor of the banks, moreover, of the 
bankers.”  
Scholars have noted that the initial structure of the consolidation bonds, specifically the 
Series B bonds, was unattractive for a number of reasons. Series B bonds were issued in 
 
5 For more information about the bank recapitalization program, see: Oguri, Junko. Forthcoming 2021. “The 
Hungarian Bank Recapitalization Program 1993–1994.” Journal of Financial Crises. 
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exchange for interest arrears and fees and comprised approximately one-third of the 
transferred debt. However, these bonds were scheduled to pay only half of the market 
interest rate. These features put the banks that participated at a “distinct disadvantage” in 
the long-term and reversed positive balance sheet effects. The government ultimately 
decided to swap the Series B bonds for Series A bonds (Várhegyi and Boros-Kazai 1994).  
Another consideration in designing and implementing such interventions is timing and the 
length of planning. Várhegyi and Boros-Kazai (1994) noted that the loan consolidation 
proposal underwent multiple modifications before it was finalized in March 1993. Balassa 
(1996) noted that the Hungarian government delayed decision-making for how to address 
the increasingly urgent NPL problem and was eventually “pressed for time” The “lengthy 
multi-stage procedure” is considered to be a factor in the higher cost of the banking system 
restructuring (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). The prolonged timeframe also contributed to 
“moral hazard of various agents,” which Ábel and Szakadát (1997) argue could have been 
avoided without the multiple stages to the banking system restructuring.  
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The Hungarian Loan Consolidation Program (LCP): Hungary Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$33.4 billion in 1991 
$37.3 billion in 1992 
$38.6 billion in 1993 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$3,219.77 in 1991 
$3,597.11 in 1992 
$3,726.83 in 1993 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
Data not available in 
1991–1993 
Size of banking system 
 
$28.2 billion in 1991  
$28.9 billion in 1992 
$28.6 billion in 1993 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
84.4% in 1991 
77.3% in 1992  
74.1% in 1993  
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
Data not available in 
1991–1993 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
41.5% in 1991 
43.7% in 1992 
42.7% in 1993 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
14.7% in 1991 
15.3% in 1992 
28.0% in 1993 
Government ownership of banking system 
90% majority ownership 
in 1990 
27% majority ownership 
in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance Yes in 1991–1993 
Sources: Ábel and Szakadát 1997; World Bank Population Data; IMF 1995; Orszagos 
Betetbiztositasi Alap (National Deposit Insurance Fund of Hungary); author’s calculations.  
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Key Design Decisions  
1. Part of a Package: The Hungarian government implemented the loan consolidation 
program (LCP) in 1992 and 1993 after adopting new banking and bankruptcy 
legislation; however, the LCP proved insufficient to address the solvency issues at 
the banks, and the government recapitalized banks in 1993 and 1994.  
Prior to the implementation of the LCP, the Hungarian government passed three laws that 
amended and established requirements related to banking, bankruptcy, and accounting 
standards. The Banking Act of 1991 required banks to provision for loan losses and achieve 
a CAR of 8% by January 1994. The Accounting Act of 1991 required that companies prepare 
financial statements that conformed with International Accounting Standards (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997). The Bankruptcy Act of 1991 set an automatic trigger for bankruptcy, 
requiring firms with debts more than 90 days past due to initiate bankruptcy (Nováková 
2003). These regulatory changes revealed the high level of NPLs in Hungary and had an 
“unprecedented impact on the financial sector” (Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
At the end of 1991, the government issued guarantees to banks for a portion of the loans 
transferred as part of the 1987 financial sector reform; these loans were increasingly 
deteriorating in quality. The guarantees covered loans that had been extended primarily to 
the state-owned coal mining sector, with a total of HUF 10.5 billion in debt at face value 
covered by the government guarantees. The measure proved insufficient to address the full 
scope of banking sector problems—many inherited loans were nonperforming, and banks 
continued to lend in an “imprudent” manner because of the possibility of a future 
recapitalization or government guarantee (IMF 1995).  
In 1992 and 1993, the Hungarian government adopted both a bank-oriented LCP and firm-
oriented LCP to address the prevalence of nonperforming loans and weakness in the banking 
sector (Balassa 1996). For the firm-oriented program, the debt of certain state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) was eligible for exchange; this program was not directly targeted at the 
banks, but banks were an indirect beneficiary as the government purchased eligible SOE debt 
from the banks (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). Beyond the consolidation programs, the 
government took resolution and restructuring action for three banks in 1993 (Balassa 1996; 
Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
Despite removing NPLs from the banking system, the Hungarian banks continued to 
experience high levels of NPLs, and the Hungarian government followed the LCP with a 
recapitalization program in 1993–1994 (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). Under the 
recapitalization program, a bank received capital from the government on the condition that 
it entered into an agreement (a consolidation contract) regarding plans for reorganization 
and debt resolution (IMF 1995).  
2. Legal Authority: The annual budget laws provided the authority to issue 
consolidation bonds, but the Hungarian government did not pass laws authorizing 
or governing the LCP or subsequent restructuring of the banking system.  
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Legal authority for NPL acquisitions came from government resolutions and the annual 
budget laws that provided for the issuance of consolidation bonds (Balassa 1996). 
Specifically, the 1993 budget law authorized the government to issue the credit 
consolidation bonds (Bonin and Schaffer 1995).  
According to Balassa (1996), the government “would have been warranted to specify the 
goals and rules of the entire [bank restructuring] process in the form of a law enacted by 
Parliament.” However, the government did not submit a bill, and Balassa attributes it to 
factors including “the uncertainties in forecasting the dimensions of the entire series of 
actions, the step-by-step evolution of the methods applied, the technical complications of the 
matter and the rightful concern that the preparation and discussions of the bill would take 
so long that the necessary measures would not have been possible to implement.”  
3. Special Powers: The Hungarian government did not provide special legal authority 
related to debt collection or recovery, but one of the government agencies received 
ex post legal authority to forgive its full portfolio of LCP debt.  
The LCPs differ from other AMC-type interventions because the government did not 
establish a centralized resolution agency. The Hungarian LCPs were administered by the 
MoF, which did not receive special legal authority. A portion of the bank-oriented LCP debt 
was sold to the state-owned Hungarian Investment and Development Bank (HIDB) which 
did not appear to have special legal authority. For the firm-oriented LCP, the two state-
owned agencies—the State Property Agency (SPA) and the Hungarian State Holding 
Company (HSHC)—were responsible for resolution and disposal of the debt purchased by 
the state. The HSHC forgave all of the outstanding claims against the eight companies within 
its portfolio, but the MOF legalized this action only after it occurred. The SPA did not have 
such legal authority because of its status as a budgetary agency, and thus used other methods 
to resolve the debt (see Key Design Decision No. 13 on recovery and disposal) (Balassa 
1996).  
4. Mandate: The purpose of the LCP was to acquire bad debt from Hungarian banks, 
but the government did not announce a specific mandate related to minimizing 
losses or maximizing recovery. 
The Hungarian government intended for the LCP to transfer bad debt off the balance sheets 
of Hungarian banks. The HIDB, SPA, and HSHC were established independently of the LCPs, 
but these agencies were responsible for the resolution of a portion of the LCP debt. These 
agencies had separate purposes and resolution methods available to them. For example, the 
HSHC forgave its entire portfolio of debt from the firm-oriented LCP. Under the firm-oriented 
LCP, enterprises were chosen based on their strategic importance: the government 
considered their “survival for reasons of ‘industrial policy’ as necessary” despite their 
indebtedness. These companies were also considered important from an employment policy 
standpoint (Balassa 1996). Therefore, an important consideration in the resolution of debt 
under the firm-oriented LCP was ensuring the survival of these strategic enterprises.  
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5. Ownership Structure: The government did not establish a centralized AMC; rather 
the government acquired the bad debt and later sold a portion of the bad debt to 
one of three government-owned entities.  
The Hungarian government rejected proposals for a centralized asset management agency—
multiple government agencies including the MoF, NBH, and the State Banking Supervision 
(SBS) objected to the proposal for a centralized AMC. According to Balassa (1996), the 
reasons for objections included the predicted difficulty in staffing such an agency, the threat 
that the agency would have forgiven the debts, and the concern that the method would not 
utilize the existing knowledge and relationships of the banks.  
The Hungarian LCP differs from traditional AMCs because the majority of bad debt 
purchased by the government remained with the banks for resolution, at least in the short 
term. A portion of the bad debt purchased by the Ministry of Finance from the Hungarian 
banks was sold to the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank (HIDB), which was fully 
owned by the government (Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
Under the firm-oriented LCP, the government transferred the acquired debt to the 
Hungarian State Holding Company and the State Property Agency, both of which were 
government-owned property management companies (Balassa 1996).  
6. Governance/Administration: The Ministry of Finance was responsible for the 
administration of the LCP and sold portions of the debt to other government-
owned agencies. 
The Hungarian MoF was responsible for the administration of the LCP, and the HIDB was 
able to purchase a portion of bad debt under the bank-oriented LCP. For the firm-oriented 
LCP, the government transferred SOE-related bad debt to the Hungarian State Holding 
Company and the State Property Agency.  
As a part of the acquisition process, a state agency was responsible for confirming that the 
banks had classified the loans that were to be transferred properly (Balassa 1996).  
7. Size: The Hungarian government did not announce a maximum program size prior 
to launching the LCP.  
The Hungarian government did not announce a predetermined size for the LCP. Banks could 
voluntarily and independently determine which loans they wanted to sell to the government, 
and prior to the program launch, banks sought to remove HUF 150 billion from their balance 
sheets (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). However, the government ultimately purchased bad debt 
with a book value of HUF 102.5 billion in exchange for HUF 81.3 billion in consolidation 
bonds in 1992. In 1993, the government purchased an additional HUF 17.3 billion in bad 
debt from banks at face value; therefore, the total book value of debt purchased from 
Hungarian banks under the bank-oriented LCP was HUF 120.5 billion, in exchange for 
approximately HUF 100 billion in consolidation bonds. Under the firm-oriented LCP, the 
government purchased a book value of HUF 61.3 billion in bad debt in exchange for HUF 57.3 
billion in consolidation bonds (Balassa 1996).  
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8. Funding Source: The Hungarian government funded the acquisition of bad debt 
under the LCP.  
According to Balassa (1996), the Hungarian government had two options for assuming the 
financial burden of the banking system restructuring: either pay in cash or use government 
securities. At the time, the Hungarian government would not have been able to use cash 
unless it received a loan from a multilateral institution, such as the International Monetary 
Fund or World Bank, but the government was not able to receive a loan from such an 
institution. Therefore, issuing government securities was the only available funding source 
for the consolidation program. Consolidation bonds, which were transferred in exchange for 
bad debt, were authorized under the state budget law and increased the state debt (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997; Balassa 1996).  
9. Eligible Institutions: Domestic banks with CAR of less than 7.25% were eligible to 
participate in the bank-oriented program on a voluntary basis, while banks 
holding debt from a specific list of SOEs were eligible to voluntarily participate in 
the firm-oriented LCP.  
For the bank-oriented credit consolidation, domestic banks with CAR of less than 7.25% as 
of the end of 1992 could participate. A total of 14 banks and 69 savings cooperatives 
participated in the credit consolidation (Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
The firm-oriented credit consolidation program did not specify the eligible financial 
institutions; rather, there was a government-identified list of eligible SOEs for which it would 
purchase outstanding bank debt in exchange for consolidation bonds.  
10. Eligible Assets: Loans issued prior to October 1, 1992, that were classified as “bad” 
were eligible for voluntary transfer under the bank-oriented LCP; debt from a 
government-specified list of SOEs was eligible for voluntary transfer under the 
firm-oriented LCP.  
Eligible domestic banks could sell loans that were classified as “bad” that had been issued 
prior to October 1, 1992 (IMF 1995). From these loans, the bank could choose which loans 
to transfer—the LCP did not require that banks transfer all such assets to the government. 
Housing loans, consumer loans, and loans to foreigners or financial institutions were not 
eligible for transfer under the LCP (Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
In setting the time-based criteria for the loans, the MoF elaborated on its rationale, noting 
that including more current loans would have increased moral hazard, “stimulat[ing] the 
banks to be irresponsible in their lending policies” (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). Therefore, the 
MoF sought to mitigate moral hazard risks when it set the criteria for eligible assets. 
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For the firm-oriented LCP, the government determined a list of specific firms whose 
outstanding debt was eligible for purchase. These included Hungarian Railways (MÁV), 13 
industrial SOEs, eight food processing firms, and several agricultural cooperatives and state-
owned farms (Ábel and Szakadát 1997). These firms were considered “strategic” to the 
economy and designated as “privileged enterprises,” as the government considered their 
survival to be necessary even though the firms were heavily indebted (Balassa 1996).  
11. Acquisition – Mechanics: In exchange for the transfer of bad debt, the government 
issued credit consolidation bonds to the banks and ultimately removed the initial 
distinction between bonds exchanged for principal and bonds exchanged for 
interest arrears and fees.  
In exchange for bad loans, the government issued consolidation bonds. Under the bank-
oriented LCP, bond issuance totaled nearly HUF 100 billion while the total bonds issued 
under the enterprise-oriented LCP totaled HUF 57.3 billion (Balassa 1996). Initially, there 
were two types of bonds: Series A and Series B. Series A bonds were issued in exchange for 
principal while Series B bonds were exchanged for interest arrears and fees. The Series A 
bonds paid a market-based interest rate, had a 20-year maturity, and were freely negotiable 
(IMF 1995). Series B bonds, which were planned to pay only half of the market interest rate, 
were later converted by the government into Series A bonds (Ábel and Szakadát 1997; IMF 
1995). Initially, as part of the Series B bonds, the government planned to impose a 
consolidation fee on the banks, which would have decreased the interest income stream by 
50%, but the government ultimately removed the consolidation fee by converting the Series 
B bonds to Series A bonds (Ábel and Szakadát 1997).  
12. Acquisition – Pricing: Depending on the date of classification, the transfer price 
was either 50 or 80% of face value, though some debt was purchased at 100% of 
face value.  
The government exchanged consolidation bonds for loans classified as “bad” as of the end of 
1992. The purchase price was dependent on when the loan was classified as bad:  
• For loans classified as bad before 1992, the government paid 50% of face value;  
• For loans classified as bad in 1992, the government paid 80% of face value (Balassa 
1996).  
The discounted portion of debt was charged against the banks’ provisions (IMF 1995). 
In certain cases for specific debtor companies, the government paid 100% of face value 
(Balassa 1996). For example, debt that had been guaranteed by the government and debt 
that was held from a company that was restructured by the State Property Agency or the 
State Assets Holding Company could be transferred for 100% of face value with the approval 
of the MoF (Ábel and Bonin 1993).  
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13. Management and Disposal: The majority of the debt transferred under the bank-
oriented LCP remained under the management of the originating bank under 
temporary contracts with the MoF, though a portion was transferred to a 
government-owned agency, while the debt transferred under the firm-oriented 
LCP was transferred to one of two government owned-entities.  
The Ministry of Finance sold HUF 40 billion in face value of bad debt from the bank-oriented 
LCP to the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank (HIDB) for management. The HIDB 
opted to purchase the debt from companies “whose reorganization and improvement 
seemed promising” and ultimately acquired debt from 56 enterprises. The HIDB had three 
options for resolution or disposal: debt-to-equity conversions, debt rescheduling, or debt 
forgiveness. Of the claims purchased by the HIDB, 95% were against companies under 
liquidation. Overall, 19 companies were successfully reorganized (Balassa 1996). 
For the remaining debt, the Ministry of Finance entered into three-month contracts with the 
selling banks where the bank remained responsible for the management of the debt. These 
contracts were renewed every three months through the middle of 1994 (Balassa 1996). The 
MoF offered the remaining debt for sale to companies that engaged in the management of 
bad debt, but only a small portion (HUF 7 billion) was sold in this manner (Balassa 1996; 
Ábel and Szakadát 1997). In 1995, the HIDB began to manage the remaining HUF 63 billion 
in debt on behalf of the MoF (Balassa 1996; Ábel and Szakadát 1997). The HIDB was allowed 
to retain 35% of the net revenue on the recovery of the remaining debt. As of 1997, the total 
recovery on the bank-oriented LCP totaled approximately HUF 6 billion (Ábel and Szakadát 
1997).  
For the firm-oriented LCP, the government transferred nonperforming loans to the 
Hungarian State Holding Company and the State Property Agency (IMF 1995). In 1994, the 
Hungarian State Holding Company forgave all HUF 24 billion in debt at book value that it 
acquired from eight SOEs (IMF 1995; Balassa 1996). This blanket forgiveness was initiated 
despite the lack of viable reorganization plans, and it was legalized ex post by the MoF 
(Balassa 1996). Because the State Property Agency would have required parliamentary 
approval to forgive debt, it swapped HUF 16 billion in debt for equity and then transferred 
the remaining debt to the newly established State Privatization and Holding Company (ÁPV 
Rt.) (Balassa 1996; Ábel and Szakadát 1997). It is not clear how the ÁPV Rt. managed, 
disposed, or recovered its portfolio of debt.  
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14. Timeframe: The bank-oriented LCP launched in 1993, but it does not appear that 
the government specified a deadline for the resolution of the transferred bad debt.  
It does not appear that the Hungarian government specified a timeframe for the LCP or a 
deadline for NPL resolution. The Hungarian government discussed proposals to clean up 
bank balance sheets in 1992 and announced the final version of the program on December 
29, 1992. The proposal was later “’refined’” by the Minister of Finance on March 8, 1993 
(Várhegyi and Boros-Kazai 1994). The government entered into a fixed contract with banks 
on March 16 and began operations of the LCP at that time (Várhegyi and Boros-Kazai 1994; 
Ábel and Bonin 1993). The firm-oriented LCP launched in the fourth quarter of 1993 (IMF 
1995).  
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